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Theology of Creation and Natural Science
Wolfliart Pannenberg
The author advocates for the mediating role ofphilosophy in the dialogues between
science and theology, in particular, the dialogues to clarify that the creation ofbiblicalfaith
is the same entity as the cosmos of scientific study. He points out that most current scientific
concepts, such as field,' have a prior history of usage in philosophical discourse, before
being modified for usage in scientific contexts. This example, together with associated con-
cepts, holds special promise for developing a contemporary theology ofdivine presence and
action.
Introduction: philosophy's role in
the dialogue between theology and
the natural sciences
Half a century ago. Karl Barth wrote in
the preface to his treatment of creation in
his Church Dogmatics that there are "abso-
lutely no scientific questions, objections or
supports concerning what scripture and the
Christian church understand to be God's
work of creation." ' Such a restriction of the
theology of creation to a "retelling" of what
the Bible tells us about this subject has its
price, and the price to be paid here was that
it could no longer be made clear just how
far the biblical faith in creation means the
same world that the human race now inhab-
its and that is described by modern science.
The affirmation that the God of the Bible
created the world degenerates into an empty
formula, and that very biblical God becomes
a powerless phantom if no longer understood
as the one who originates and completes the
world as it is given to our experience. For
this reason, one should not agree with Barth,
but rather with Karl Heim, in his attempt to
relate theological affirmations about the cre-
ation and final consummation of the world
to the respective conceptions of contempo-
rary science. In the context of Anglican the-
ology, a theological appropriation of
Darwin's doctrine of evolution was devel-
oped as early as 1889, in the famous vol-
ume Lux Mundi, edited by Charles Gore,
where the biblical conception of a history of
salvation, culminating in the event of incar-
nation, was combined with the modern evo-
lutionary perspective. This view has been
effective into the present day. together with
related ideas issuing from the work of
Teilhard de Chardin.
In spite of all the difficulties of a theo-
logical interpretation of the natural world.
Christian theology must not evade the task
of interpreting the same world that is de-
scribed by scientists to be, in fact, the cre-
ation of God. It is not enough simply to de-
clare the world to be God's creation; such a
theological affirmation has to be made plau-
sible. This is not to suggest that theology
should enter the discussions among scien-
tists on their level of scientific description
and theory. Theological interpretation of the
world of nature in terms of creation cannot
be presented as competing with physics or
with any other natural science. Claims like
that are excluded by the fact that theologi-
cal arguments move on another method-
ological level than the hypotheses of natu-
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ral law in the sciences do. with their exami-
nation by experiment. From a theological
perspective, the reality of the world presents
itself in the form of a unique and irrevers-
ible historical process which is the result and
expression of divine action. Certainly, in the
process of this history, there emerge unifor-
mities and structural types of sequences of
natural events that correspond to the scien-
tific concept of natural law. In the book of
Genesis, after the story on the flood, it says:
"As long as the earth endures, seedtime and
harvest, cold and heat, summer and winter,
day and night, shall not cease.*' 2 Such regu-
The affirmation that the God of the
Bible created the world degenerates
into an emptyformula, and that very
biblical God becomes a powerless phan-
tom if no longer understood as the one
who originates and completes the world
as it is given to our experience.
larities of natural processes, however, are
themselves considered as products of a
unique divine decision, not as evidence of a
timeless order of nature. The theological
focus on the historically unique and on the
irreversible process of history is also related
to the fact that theology does not conceive
of space and time in the sense of homoge-
neous sequences of spatial and temporal
units, sequences that can be geometrically
constructed, counted and measured. The
mathematical form of representing and de-
scribing natural processes and the scientific
concept of law belong together. The absence
of mathematical description in theology, on
the other hand, speaks not merely to the in-
ability of theologians, but also to the pecu-
liarity of the theological subject matter and
its appropriate treatment.
Now, the question arises, whether the-
ology exemplifies a qualitative mode of de-
scribing reality, a mode that has been reduced
so often in the history of modern science to
a quantitative and, consequently, mathemati-
cal way of description. The ideas of the bib-
lical reports on creation, about the sequence
in the emergence of natural forms, have been
indeed replaced in modern science by con-
ceptions based on quantitative descriptions
of processes regulated by natural law.
Should this tendency be generally valid con-
cerning the relationship between theology
and science? Professor Frank Tipler, math-
ematical physicist at Tulane University,
claims in his recent book, The Physics ofIm-
mortality, that theology finally
has to be absorbed into phys-
ics. He tries to show that the
history of the universe tends
towards an omega point, char-
acterized by peculiar proper-
ties of the traditional concept
of God, and which functions
not only as the result but also
as the creative origin of the
movement of the universe. It
is, therefore, occasion for an
identical repetition of all forms
of intelligent life in the dimension of eter-
nity. Tipler accounts for these claims by a
proposed theory of scientific cosmology.
The educated layman cannot help being im-
pressed, but he or she is also impressed by
the multitude of different models of scien-
tific cosmology produced over recent de-
cades. Cosmology, to all appearance, is a
highly speculative discipline. But how is
theology to be expected to relate to the pos-
sibility of those arguments?
I think that attempted transformations
of theology into physics should be observed
with curiosity on the one hand, but also with
a certain degree of skepticism on the other.
Curiosity and openness are appropriate,
since even tentative constructions of this
kind work against the widespread prejudice
that theological and scientific conceptions
are unrelated—a prejudice the effect of
which is usually that theology seems to be
10 Journal ofFaith and Science Exchange, 1998
irrelevant concerning our understanding of
the reality of the world we inhabit. Skepti-
cism, however, is appropriate, because of the
apparent incommensurability between the
scientific conception of natural law and the
theological approach to reality. Could, in-
deed, the conception of the world in terms
of a unique and irreversible history of ever
new and contingent events—including the
idea of God providing their origin, and of
Christian eschatological hope—be dis-
solved, without important remnant, into a de-
scription of the world process in terms of
natural law?
Even at this point, I see no basis for
theological anxieties. After all, there is the
historical parallel of Aristotelian physics, the
objects of which included the existence of
God. though not a future resurrection of the
dead. A proper conception of God as cre-
ative origin of the natural universe, to be
sure, had to describe the creation of the world
It is not enough simply to declare the
world to be God's creation, but such a
theological affirmation has to be made
plausible. This is not to suggest that
theology should enter the discussions
among scientists on their level of
scientific description and theory.
by starting from God as origin of it, rather
than dealing with God as an exponent of the
cosmic process. In Christian theology, such
a comprehensive knowledge of creation that
would comprise all the different aspects of
created reality is not expected before the fi-
nal consummation of the world, in connec-
tion with the eschatological vision of the
glorified ones. Until then, it seems likely
that human knowledge about the world will
develop under conditions of human finitude
and, therefore, in the form of conjectures
only, and by way of their examination and
revision. In a reverse argument. Christian
theology seeks to conceive of God as cre-
ator of the world on the basis of the revela-
tion in Jesus Christ. But in doing this, the-
ology is not in a position to explain in detail
the processes in the natural world.
The aim of reaching an agreement be-
tween the theology of creation, on the one
hand, and the scientific knowledge about the
world of nature on the other, may be indi-
cated, then, more properly by the term con-
sonance between the two perspectives than
by any sort of reduction of one of them to
the other. Consonance presupposes the ab-
sence of contradiction. But it requires more
than that. Contradictions can be absent sim-
ply because ideas stand unrelated to each
other. Consonance, however, implies the
image of some harmony and. consequently,
of a positive relationship. How can such a
consonance be claimed with respect to
affirmations that belong to
quite different method-
ological levels? In such a
case, it is necessary to look
for a third level to which the
two others are related. In
the case of the dialogue be-
tween science and theology,
such a third level has. in-
deed, always existed. It is
the level of philosophy.
Whenever scientists
talk about the relevance of
their findings and theoreti-
cal formulas in view of the understanding
of reality, they move in the medium of philo-
sophical reflection on procedures and results
of their science, and not. in the strict sense,
on the level of scientific argument. Reflec-
tions on the relationship between natural law
and the contingency of events, between cau-
sality and freedom, matter and energy, the
concepts of time and space or evolution, take
place inevitably in a medium that is impreg-
nated with philosophical language and its
history. Furthermore, in most cases, key con-
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cepts of science have philosophical origins
and underwent modifications in order to fit
the requirements of their use in science.
Recent investigations into the history of sci-
entific concepts, such as space, time, mass,
force and field, demonstrated connections be-
tween the philosophical meaning of these
concepts and their scientific use. Therefore,
together with familiarity with the philosophi-
cal discussions on these subjects, a degree of
knowledge in the history of science and es-
pecially about the history of scientific termi-
nology is a presupposition of a productive
dialogue between theology and the sciences.
Christian theology, on the other hand,
during the entire course of its history, has
In most cases, key concepts of science have
philosophical origins and underwent modifi-
cations in order to fit the requirements of their
use in science... . Therefore, a degree of
knowledge in the history of science and espe-
cially about the history of scientific terminol-
ogy is a presupposition ofa productive dia-
logue between theology and the sciences.
developed in close connection with philoso-
phy, though the relationship was not with-
out its complications and strains. In con-
trast to this situation with the sciences, the
relationship of theology to philosophy is not,
in the first place, a matter of philosophical
origins of a particular terminology. Rather,
it is a task of integrating into theology and
its explication of the relation of the God the
creator and redeemer of the world and hu-
manity, the philosophical language about
God, the world and the place of human be-
ings in it. Such integration of philosophical
theses and conceptions into Christian theol-
ogy always meant a more or less incisive
transformation of the philosophical mean-
ing, and occasional tensions between theol-
ogy and philosophy in the course of history
often arose from such attempts at appropria-
tion. Theology, however, in affirming the
abiding truth of the biblical God and of di-
vine revelation as concerning every human
being, always depended, and will continue
to depend, on the rational universality of
philosophy. Therefore, it had to assimilate
into itself not only the philosophical doc-
trines of God, but also the philosophical
affirmations about the world and human be-
ings. At this point, it finally becomes ap-
parent just how important the relationship
to the philosophical interpretation of the
world becomes, as the basis of a dialogue
between the sciences and Christian theology.
The inclusion of scientific considerations
and results into a reflection upon how to
! perceive of reality at
large—and of the situ-
ation of human beings
in the world—is not
the first and sole sub-
ject of a theological
doctrine of creation.
That has always be-
longed to the philo-
sophical interpretation
of the world. In its
task of critical appro-
priation and assimila-
tion of the philosophical view of the world,
theology always dealt implicitly with the
knowledge of nature given through science.
However, the theological transformation of
philosophical concepts of the world has to
be evaluated just as philosophical hypotheses
themselves are—namely, by their ability to
do justice to scientific views and results.
Unfortunately, the task of the philoso-
phy of nature and of its integrative reflec-
tion of scientific descriptions of nature is
now neglected by most philosophers. The
resulting gap is often filled by natural scien-
tists, who, from the perspective of their re-
spective discipline, offer generalized philo-
sophical reflections and conjectures concern-
ing the world at large. In this connection,
however, the horizon of philosophical prob-
lems connected with the respective subject
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matters and the history of those philosophi-
cal problems is often not appropriately con-
sidered. It these cases, it becomes the task
of theologians to be in dialogue with natural
scientists, to remind them of the philosophi-
cal problems involved in the subject matter
of such dialogues, and to argue, within such
a framework, for the specifically theologi-
cal concerns.
The purpose of the rest of this paper is
to exemplify what has been said so far in
general terms concerning the dialogue be-
tween theology and science, in relation to a
number of specific issues that appear to me
as particularly important for such a dialogue,
because they are important in the founda-
tion of any interpretation of the world. In
the first place, some reflections on the con-
cept of law seem to be appropriate, and this
in relation to the correlate of law in what is
contingently given. The correlation of these
two aspects in describing natural processes
can be shown in the concept of natural law
itself, but this also offers the opportunity for
Christian theology to relate the specifically
biblical understanding of reality to the de-
If there was a point on which modern
philosophical theology was in unanimous
agreement with the earlier scholastic
teaching about God, it was the affirma-
tion that God cannot be a body.
scription of nature by laws and formulas. A
second consideration shall focus on the ideas
of space and time, which are not only basic
in science, but also important in theological
affirmations on God's relationship to the
world. A third question will deal with the
relationship of affirmations about God and
divine activity to the motion of bodies, their
development and decay. This is the classi-
cal theme of scientific descriptions of na-
ture in the framework given by the ideas of
space and time. A clarification of how the
idea of God relates to space and time, there-
fore, may have consequences for an under-
standing of created existence and movement
within space and time in their relationship
to God. In this connection finally certain
conclusions will arise in relation to the con-
cept of evolution, but not only with respect
to the evolution of organic life, but also to
its setting in the history of the universe.
The concept of nature's laws
In 1970. 1 wrote an article called "'Con-
tingency and Natural Law." The topic had
been under close discussion for a number of
years in a circle of physicists and theologians
in Heidelberg, Germany, and my ideas had
undergone considerable modification as a re-
sult of these discussions. The subject was
interesting from the theological perspective,
because the Biblical reports on God's action
in history emphasize the element of the new
and unexpected in divine actions, an empha-
sis that also characterizes the action of God
in the creation of the world. The history of
God's action constitutes a unique and irre-
versible sequence of such contingent acts.
The concept of contingency
that is used to characterize
divine action in history has
its philosophical origin in
Aristotle. There it refers to
what occurs by chance and
to what is non-essential but
possible, in contrast to what
is necessary. In Aristotle,
however, contingency was
connected with the concept of matter; while
medieval Christian Aristotelianism, espe-
cially since Duns Scotus, connected it with
God's freedom of will and action.
The concept of natural law, on the other
hand, is logically related to conditions of its
application that are contingent in relation to
the formula of law as such, to initial condi-
tions, and to marginal conditions of the pro-
cesses described by a formula of law. Those
initial and marginal conditions can them-
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selves result from processes that, in their
turn, may be described by formulas of law.
This does not change the basic fact, how-
ever, that each such description again pre-
supposes contingent conditions of its appli-
cation, with the effect that laws of nature may
be conceived as descriptions of certain uni-
formities in natural processes that occur in
what is, basically, contingently given. This
implies the assumption that all events are
contingent in the first place, even when the
sequence of events shows similarities or
uniform structures.
This consequence appeared to the natu-
ral scientists participating in the above-men-
tioned discussions at Heidelberg in the 1960s
as rather problematic, although such an as-
sumption is also suggested by the irrevers-
ibility of time. In the meantime, the contin-
gency of events, in distinction from contin-
gency in a merely logical sense, seems to be
generally accepted, in view of the fact that
many natural processes take place in cha-
otic forms. The contingency of events can
be affirmed especially with relation to the
indeterminacy of elementary events in quan-
tum physics, provided that account is taken
of the fact that the same events, on account
of the uniformities in their sequence, also
become objects of descriptions in terms of
natural law. The possibility of such descrip-
tion, on the other hand, does not eliminate
the fundamental contingency of events;
rather, the regularities that can be observed
in contingent sequences of events and that
can be described by hypotheses are them-
selves contingent facts. But, while theologi-
cal affirmations concerning the reality of cre-
ated existence and the action of God in cre-
ation are primarily related to this aspect of
contingency in natural processes, a scientific
description of these natural processes is pri-
marily concerned with the demonstration of
regularities in those processes. However, the
dependence on something contingently given
is a precondition in the applicability of the
concept of law itself.
To those involved in the Heidelberg dis-
cussions, a common basis for the dialogue
between theology and nature seemed to
emerge from the clarification of the correla-
tion between natural law and contingency, a
common basis beyond vague analogies and
metaphors transferred from one discipline to
the other. Nevertheless, the agreement on the
correlation of natural law and contingency did
not open access to a more concrete under-
standing of nature in theological perspective.
In order to find the key to that access, a theo-
logical approach had to be developed to fun-
damental concepts of physics, such as energy
or force or movement, as well as to their pre-
supposition in ideas about space and time.
The concepts of space and time
In the early eighteenth century, a philo-
sophical dispute concerning the concept of
space took place in which theological im-
plications played a decisive role. Even to-
day, the correspondence between Leibniz
and Samuel Clarke 3 on Newton's descrip-
tion of space as sensorium Dei in his Opticks
holds more than merely historical interest.
Certainly, Newton's concept of absolute
space has become obsolete since Einstein's
theory of relativity, but Newton's thought
about space and about God's relation to
space was very complex. It is worthwhile
to take a closer look, in order to find out just
how many of these ideas have become ob-
solete and how many have not. The con-
ceptions of absolute direction in space and
of absolute dimensions of objects in space
are certainly no longer valid. But Newton's
and Clarke's ideas about God's relation to
space contain another insight that is still
important. Clarke defended Newton's attri-
bution of the concept of space to the idea of
God against Leibniz' objection that God, in
such a case, would be divisible and com-
posed of parts. Clarke's main argument was
that all division in space already presupposes
space, because division can only take place
within space. The space that is presupposed
in all spatial division is infinite and undi-
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vided; and it is this infinite space, not geo-
metrical space, composed of pails, that is
said to be identical with the divine immen-
sity that enables God to be present to every
creature at its own place. This argument was
reproduced by Kant in his Critique ofPure
Reason in 1781. According to Kant, the in-
tuition of space as an infinite whole is pre-
supposed in any conception of determinate
spaces. 4 Kant stopped exploring the theo-
logical implications of this idea, because he
conceived of space as a merely subjective
form of human intuition. As soon as one
wonders about this subjectivism, however,
as did Samuel Alexander in this century, then
the theological implications of the priority
of infinite and undivided space in relation
to every determinate concept of spaces re-
emerges before one's eyes. The point of this
argument is that the infinite space that is pre-
supposed in each division of space is neces-
sarily undivided, in contrast to all geometri-
cal conceptions of space.
Geometrical concepts of space are con-
structed on the basis of units of measure-
ment: each geometrical unit of measurement
is itself a unit of space, the concept of which
presupposes the undi-
vided whole of infinite
space. That, however, is
an infinity that is not to be
conceived the same way
as in geometry—by in-
definitely repeated addi-
tion of units of measure-
ment—but an infinity that
is prior to all division and.
therefore, also prior to all
forms of measurement.
The mistake that Spinoza
made in his conception of space as an at-
tribute of divine substance consists in the fact
that he did not distinguish infinite geometri-
cal space from the infinite undivided space
of the divine immensity—which is presup-
posed in every geometry. If this distinction
is considered, then no pantheistic conse-
quences result from such a close connection
between God and space, consequences that
Leibniz seems to have suspected in Newton's
thought. The transition from the undivided
space of divine immensity to the space of
our experience that knows of parts and places
can be considered, then, a consequence of
the occurrence of finite objects and their re-
lations to each other. In such a way one can
also do justice to the relativity of spatial re-
lations, with regard to the masses moving in
space. Each type of space that consists of
parts presupposes, as Kant emphasized,
some undivided whole of space, because di-
visions and parts are only possible within
some space that is already there and. there-
fore, prior to geometrical conceptions of
space. The ideas about divine immensity and
God's omnipresence with every creature can
be referred to this presupposition of undi-
vided space, as Newton and Clarke did, with-
out violating the divine transcendence over
the world. This contrasts with Spinoza's
conceptualization, which Einstein felt sym-
pathetic with, by the way. but which did not
distinguish between the undivided infinite
space of divine omnipresence and the space
of geometry.
One of the most renowned historians of
science in our century, Max Jammer,
who investigated the history ofa number
of key concepts ofphysics, considers the
pneuma concepts of classical antiquity
as predecessors of the field concepts of
modern physics.
The relationship between God's eternity
and time is largely analogous to that between
God's immensity and space. Kant's treat-
ment of time in his transcendental aesthet-
ics corresponded closely to his treatment of
the idea of space. In both cases, an infinite
and undivided whole is considered the pre-
condition of all division and of all concep-
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tions of parts. With reference to time this
means, "Different times are but pails of one
and the same time" 5 The undivided whole
of time, or, rather, the whole of life that ap-
pears divided in the sequence of time, has
been termed 'eternity' in the philosophical
and theological tradition, ever since the trea-
tise on time by Plotinus (3rd century c.e.) in
his Enneads. Eternity. Plotinus says, is ulti-
mate completion without parts or division
of what occurs in divided form in the se-
quence of time. 6 Boethius (d. 524 c.e.), who
transmitted this definition to later genera-
tions, called eternity the simultaneous and
complete presence of unlimited life. 7 Eter-
nity, then, is not atemporal or timeless in the
sense that eternity and time were completely
foreign to each other. Rather, according to
Plotinus, time is constituted by eternity, be-
cause the transition from one temporal mo-
ment to the next is understandable only if
we presuppose some presence of the whole
that is separated in the sequence of tempo-
ral moments even within that separation
—
in other words, a presence of eternity in the
course of time itself. The same idea is ex-
pressed in Kant's sentence: different times
are just parts of one and the same time.
However, Kant did not view time as consti-
tuted by the presence of eternity; but, in anal-
ogy to his conception of space, he thought
time to be constituted on the subject of ex-
perience—more precisely, on the "standing
and persisting" human ego, which, as per-
sisting through time, according to Kant,
forms the basis of the unity of all human
experience. 8 In view of the temporality of
the ego itself, however, which we are aware
of in our self-consciousness, Kant's attempt
of accounting for the unity of time on the
basis of the unity of the subject may seem to
be considerably more problematic than
Plotinus' foundation of time on the concept
of eternity.
From a theological perspective of na-
ture, then, God's eternity is present in time,
more specifically, as origin and completion
of time and of all temporal reality: origin in
the sense of conditioning the continuity of
what occurs separately in the sequence of
time; completion, however, because all tem-
poral reality, according to Plotinus, tends to-
ward the future, in order to realize the whole-
ness of its being. It is through the future
that eternity enters into time.
With respect to time as well as to space,
the result is that these ideas cannot be suc-
cessfully defined on the basis of measure-
ment by clocks or by spatial units of mea-
surement. This may be a very important
point in the dialogue between theology and
science, because the scientific interest in
time, as well as in spatial dimensions, is so
closely connected with the possibility of
measurement. The ideas of space and time,
however, claim priority over those regard-
ing measurement techniques. If this prior-
ity is neglected, contradictions will be the
inevitable consequence. This is so, because
all units of measurement are themselves al-
ready parts of time and space that have to be
delimited within time and space from other
such pails and, therefore, already presuppose
time and space as such.
Motion, force, and field
Much more difficult than the question of
the relationship of space and time to God's
immensity and eternity is a clarification of
God's relation to the forces working in the
motions of nature. And yet, this is a decisive
question for every biblically based doctrine
of creation, because at this point the possibil-
ity of God's action in creation is at stake, ac-
tion not only in the beginning, but also in the
entire process of the history of creation. It
was at this point that, in the seventeenth and
eighteenth century, the alienation between
Christian theology and the scientific descrip-
tion of nature began. The starting point of
this alienation was the mechanistic interpre-
tation of natural processes. Descartes inau-
gurated it and it triumphed against Newton's
intentions in the eighteenth century, when all
natural force was reduced to bodies and to
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their effects upon each other. This concep-
tion necessarily excluded God from the un-
derstanding of natural processes. If there was
a point on which modern philosophical the-
ology was in unanimous agreement with the
earlier scholastic teaching about God, it was
the affirmation that God cannot be a body. If
all natural force resides in bodies, then any
idea of an exercise of power on God's part
and, resultantly, any assumption of divine
action in the course of nature were a priori
excluded. Thus, God was respectfully urged
out of the natural world.
When one duly considers the far-reach-
ing consequences that the reduction of forces
and motion to conceptions of bodies and
masses had upon an atheistic picture of na-
ture, one can also imagine the potential sig-
nificance that Faraday's introduction of field
concepts into the description of natural pro-
cesses would have for a theological inter-
pretation. This statement does not mean that
Just as God's omnipresence is co-present
to all things withoutfalling prey to the
relativistic paradoxes of simultaneity—
since God's omnipresence is not depen-
dent on the velocity of light—in a similar
way, the field effects of divine omnipres-
ence are not in need of being transmitted
by waves.
the demonstration of the efficacy of electric
and magnetic fields could immediately be
used as a model to conceive of God's effi-
cacy in nature. But although field effects
usually have their correlate in masses, Fara-
day had already entertained a vision of fi-
nally interpreting all bodily phenomena as
manifestations of fields. A vision like that
was close to Newton's own vision that the
forces of natural movement are, in the end,
not material, as they do not issue from bod-
ies. Rather, Newton conceived of God's ef-
ficacy in the universe in analogy to how the
human spirit moves the parts of the body.
An introduction of the field concept into
theology is not. however, suggested prima-
rily by the question of how to understand
God's activity in nature; but it is suggested
first by internal problems in the doctrine of
God. The designation of the divine being as
"spirit" in the Gospel of John
1
' has been in-
terpreted since Origen in the sense that God
is nous, a bodiless spiritual intellect. But
this Platonizing interpretation does not cor-
respond to the original meaning of the bibli-
cal word pneuma, nor to the corresponding
Hebrew word ruah. In both cases, the root
meaning is moved air. breath, even wind. In
Greek thought, the word pneuma, which is
usually translated by "spirit," was used in
the sense of air in motion, as in breath or
wind. This applies to the pre-Socratic phi-
losophers, especially to Anaximenes, but
also and particularly to the Stoics. Accord-
ing to Stoic doctrine, air. as
the most subtle element,
penetrates everything and
holds the entire cosmos to-
gether through its particu-
lar "tension" (tonos). Early
Christian theologians be-
fore the third century un-
derstood the New Testa-
ment identification of God
as pneuma in similar ways.
Now. one of the most re-
nowned historians of sci-
ence in our century. Max
Jammer, who investigated the history of a
number of key concepts of physics, consid-
ers the pneuma concepts of classical antiq-
uity as predecessors of the field concepts of
modern physics. Indeed, the intuitive idea
of a field of power comes to paradigmatic
expression in "a state of tension in the air."
Modern field concepts, however, differ
in an important aspect from the conceptions
of pneuma in classical antiquity: field ef-
fects do not require a material medium like
air or "ether"—though in the nineteenth cen-
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tury, an ether was still assumed. Field ef-
fects can pervade space without such a me-
dium. The materialism of the Stoic doctrine
ofpneuma as air, however, in the sense of a
most subtle element that penetrates every-
thing else, formed the main reason for
Origen's rejection of this conception in in-
terpreting the Johannine characterization of
God as spirit. The absurdities of a concep-
tion of God as body—as divisible and com-
posed of parts—formed the negative reason
for interpreting pneuma in terms ofnous, and
thus for conceiving of God in the image of a
bodiless intellect. It is now evident that this
conception does not correspond to the root
meaning ofpneuma. At this point, the field
concept that replaces the pneuma doctrines
of classical antiquity can become helpful in
theology, because it allows the root mean-
ing of pneuma to be distinguished from the
concept of a material basis, ether, or medium.
If the divine reality is conceived in terms of
a field that manifests itself in the three "per-
sons" of Father, Son and Holy Spirit, then
justice is done to Origen's objections against
any conception of God as body, while pre-
serving the genuine meaning of pneuma.
Is such a theological use of the field
concept a mere metaphor? At first glance, it
may look like that. But one should not over-
look that the fundamental requirement has
been met for the application of the concept
of field to theology, namely, the relationship
to time and space—though in the sense of
what has been said about the undivided infi-
nite space of divine immensity, presupposed
in all geometrical description of space, and
about the undivided unity of time in God's
eternity as the condition of all temporal se-
quence. The interpretation of the pneumatic
particularity of God's being as field can be
accounted for by relating it to the undivided
wholeness of time and space prior to all geo-
metrical description. By the same reason, it
is distinguished from the field concepts of
physics, but would function as a condition
of those by analogy to what had to be said
concerning space and time. The field of di-
vine omnipotence, then, does not compete
with concrete physical fields, but its activ-
ity works through all the natural forces with-
out being exhausted by them. Just as God's
omnipresence is co-present to all things with-
out falling prey to the relativistic paradoxes
of simultaneity—since God's omnipresence
is not dependent on the velocity of light—in
a similar way, the field effects of divine om-
nipresence are not in need of being trans-
mitted by waves. The concept of waves,
though important in the field notions of clas-
sical physics and especially as a basis for
quantitative descriptions of field effects, may
not be constitutive of the field concept as
such, even though that concept would be
empty without being related to time and
space. If the concept of field in the strict
sense can be conceived of without the idea
of expanding through waves, then types of
non-local, instantaneous communication
between physical phenomena can also be
conceived of in terms of field effects.
In the framework of this paper, it is not
possible to apply what has been said thus
far to a theological interpretation of the world
of creatures, according to the sequence of
their emergence in the history of the uni-
verse. A sketch of such an interpretation has
been published in the context of my treat-
ment of the doctrine of creation in the sec-
ond volume of my Systematic Theology. In
the dialogue between theology and science,
however, it is even more important to reach
agreement about the foundations of interpre-
tations of such a type. This much may be
said here: the key for perceiving the inter-
connection of eternity and time lies with the
relevance of the future in understanding ev-
erything existing in time. It is through the
future that eternity enters into time. Ever
new contingent events proceed from the fu-
ture, and, on the other hand, everything ex-
isting in time can expect from the future only
the possible wholeness of its life. All things
proceed towards the kingdom of God, whose
sovereignty is already at work by entering
from God's future into the presence of all
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creatures. From the point of view of the crea-
tures, this relationship gets reversed: the
future becomes the direction of extrapola-
tions from the present and from whatever is
known from the past. That is also true in the
history of the universe. Mythical interpre-
tation of the world looks at the order of the
universe as founded in its beginning. Even
the biblical report of creation, though no
longer a myth in its literal form, exemplifies
this way of looking at the world. The image
of the foundation of all creaturely forms in a
first week of seven days is in a certain ten-
sion, however, to the perspective otherwise
characteristic for the biblical understanding
of reality, the perspective of ever new ac-
tions of God in history toward the future
completion of creation. The idea of an or-
der of creation, complete in the beginning
and not significantly changed in subsequent
time, made agreement between theologians
and scientists difficult for a long period, es-
pecially during the struggle about the doc-
trine of evolution. Much more important,
however, in view of a possible consonance
between a theology of creation and natural
science, is that the evolution of life occurs
within an irreversible process, where again
and again contingencies occur.
It is similar with the history of the uni-
verse. With regard to the origin and evolu-
tion of life, as well as in the field of cosmol-
ogy, the ideological barriers between the
scientific description of the world and the
interpretation of the same world in Chris-
tian theology broke down. One would be
asking too much if scientific cosmology
were expected to produce a demonstration
of the existence of God right away, as Pope
Pius XII believed at the time of the first en-
thusiasm about the present standard model
of the expanding universe. It is sufficient
that theological interpretation of the history
of the universe in terms of creation can be
developed in consonance with scientific data
and procedures. To this end, it is necessary
that the theological doctrine of creation re-
main able to learn, not in the sense of adapt-
ing itself apologetically to every change of
the scientific description of nature, but in the
sense that theology remains vigorous enough
to keep developing, from its own resources,
new interpretations that try to do justice to a
changing state of experiential knowledge of
our world, in order to integrate it into the
Christian understanding of the cosmos as be-
ing created by the God of the Bible.
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